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Abstract
This essay investigates the implementation of istihsan (juristic
preference) in the early history of Islam by identifying the con-
cept of ijtihad (independent effort) and ra’y (juristic opinion),
both of which played an enormous role in the development of
Islamic law. Ijtihad by ra’y (personal judgment in juridical judg-
ment) has been practiced from the time of the Prophet, as reflect-
ed in several hadiths narrated by Mu`adh ibn Jabal (d.18/640).
The Prophet taught him how to use personal discretion and
encouraged the Companions to undertake ijtihad by ra’y with
regard to various issues.
The criteria of personal judgment in istihsan indicate a direct rela-
tionship between istihsan and ijtihad by ra’y. The nature of istih-
san, the wisdom behind it, and the wisdom of its use is quite con-
siderable. As istihsan is considered a product of ijtihad, it repre-
sents simplicity, ease, and the lifting of difficulties. If the resulting
qiyas (analogy) is not in keeping with the Shari`ah’s spirit, then
the ruling of similarities should be abandoned in order to give a
ruling according to the special evidence that justifies its spirit.
The definitions of istihsan, ijtihad, and ra’y; the historical per-
spective of ra’y; the validity of ijtihad and its implementation at
the time of the Prophet and the Companions; and the practices of
ijtihad in terms of istihsan among the Companions are all
explored in this paper.
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Introduction
Following the end of Revelation, Islamic law was developed with great
effort by those who had the authority and expertise, despite the rapid
changes in social, economic, and political life. The jurists’ contributions
greatly enhanced Islamic law’s ability to maneuver and to be flexible.
Therefore, Islamic law is described as a law made by jurists.1
In order to assess istihsan (juristic preference), it is necessary to first
consider its basis, for it is possible that its main source of inspiration is ra’y
(personal judgment). The criteria of ra’y indicate a direct relationship
between istihsan and ijtihad (independent effort) by ra’y. Moreover, istihsan
is a product of ijtihad. In fact, Abu Hanifah (d. 150/767) performed ijtihad
based on his personal opinions, conforming to the Qur’an and the Sunnah,
by saying: “Qiyas [analogy] rules this, but we nastahsinu (prefer) that, or we
proved this by istihsan contrary to qiyas, or the qiyas of this is so and so and
the ijtihad of this is so and so, and the ijtihad we take.”2
A Brief Definition of Istihsan
In the early period of Islamic legislation, the Shari`ah’s sources were con-
fined to the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the use of ra’y, with the permission of
a competent authority. It is pointless to debate whether istihsan was applied
during the Prophet’s time as a source of law, since both the Prophet and the
Qur’an – the actual sources of the Shari`ah – were all that was needed.
Although the terminology of usul al-fiqh (the principles of Islamic jurispru-
dence) had not been systemized yet, such Companions as `Umar, `Ali, Ibn
`Abbas, and Ibn Mas`ud applied the spirit of istihsan, if not the technical
method itself.
Technically, definitions of istihsan have not reached us from the early
Islamic period, simply because there was no reason for this term to be
defined. Abu Hanifah and such other early Hanafi jurists as Abu Yusuf (d.
182/798) and al-Shaybani (d. 189/804) gave rulings via istihsan without pro-
viding any specific definitions or explanations. Their judgments were based
on the fundamental principles of securing ease and avoiding hardship: “God
intends facility and ease for you. He does not intend to put you to hardship”
(2:185).
Hanafi scholars see istihsan as a valid Shari`ah source and a basis for
formulating legal rulings. One definition, as understood by the jurists of usul
(principles) and that reflects the definition adopted by the Hanafi jurists,
who consider it accurate and comprehensive, is that of Abu al-Hasan al-
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Karkhi (d. 340/952): “Istihsan is when one takes a decision on a certain case
different from that on which similar cases have been decided on the basis of
its precedents, for a reason which is stronger than the one found in similar
cases and which requires a departure from those cases.”3 Any departure from
a previous ruling on a certain issue, which is then applied to similar issues
because of particular evidence that necessitates this departure must, accord-
ing to the jurists, be justified. This is true regardless of whether this evidence
is nass (textual), ijma` (consensus), darurah (necessity), `urf (custom),
maslahah (benefit), qiyas khafi (implicit analogy), or otherwise, and irre-
spective of whether the method used to establish the ruling on the similar
problem was based on dalil `am (general evidence), qa’idah fiqhiyah (juris-
prudence rule), or qiyas zahir jaliy (apparent clear analogy).4
According to Jassas, istihsan is the “departure from a ruling of qiyas in
favor of another ruling which is considered preferable.”5 Istihsan is evidence
that is preferred over an accepted established ruling after ensuring that this
evidence does not contravene previous Islamic legal rulings. Istihsan repre-
sents simplicity, ease, and the lifting of difficulties.
Ijtihad
Ijtihad is one of the most important key words of the Shari`ah, and its goal
is defined as comprehending the purpose of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The
main purpose of law is to maintain the continuity of answering people’s
needs. A legal system that answers the questions of its era while offering
solutions for future generations can be realized only by constantly renewing
itself. In this sense, ijtihad has very important functions in keeping the law
alive, which is one of the Shari`ah’s main dynamics.
The Definition of Ijtihad
Ijtihad is derived from two words: juhd (exertion of effort or energy) and
jahd (the forbearance of hardship, namely, striving and self-exertion in any
activity that entails a measure of hardship). Thus, it would be suitable to use
jahada for one who carries a heavy load, but not if he/she carries a trivial
weight. Ijtihad is the expenditure of effort to arrive at the correct judgment,
whether physical (e.g., walking or working) or intellectual (e.g., inferring a
ruling or a juristic and linguistic theory).6
Technically, the juristic meaning of ijtihad has several definitions
according to the usuli scholars. Some define it as the jurist’s action and activ-
ity to reach a solution. Al-Ghazzali (d. 505/1111) defines it as the “total
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expenditure of effort made by a jurist for the purpose of obtaining the reli-
gious rulings.”7 Al-Amidi (d. 631/1233) considers it to be the expenditure of
one’s total effort in search of zann (probability), to the extent that the jurist
feels obliged to exert himself/herself further in proving that the ruling is cor-
rect. His definition implies that it is not enough just to exert effort; rather, the
jurist should feel that he/she has spared no effort to pursue the issue further:
“Ijtihad is the application of the jurist using all of his faculties, either in
inferring the Shari`ah’s practical rules from the sources or in implementing
such rules and applying them to a particular issue.”8 The Shari`ah’s defini-
tive rulings that are known by necessity are therefore excluded from ijtihad,
such as the Five Pillars of Islam¸ rulings related to the `aqidah (creed), and
realizing the attributes of God, all of which are determined by explicit tex-
tual statements. There is only one correct view in regard to these matters,
and anyone who differs is wrong.9
Al-Qarafi (d. 684/1285) defines ijtihad as “the expenditure of total effort
while considering a case which is condemned by religion.”10 Al-Isnawi (d.
772/1370) explains it as “the expenditure of effort to arrive at and realize the
rulings of the Shari`ah, whether definitive (qat`i) or probable (zanni).”11
Kamal ibn al-Humam (d. 861/1457) describes it as the expenditure of efforts
by the faqih (jurisprudent) to arrive at a juristic ruling, such ruling being
either rational (`aqli) or transmitted (naqli), definitive (qat`i) or speculative
(zanni).12 Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064) differs and interprets it as “investigating
the rules of God solely in the Qur’an and in the Sunnah.”13 Fazlur Rahman
(d. 1988) defines it technically as “the effort to understand the meaning of a
relevant text or precedent in the past, containing a rule, and to alter that rule
by extending, restricting or otherwise modifying it in such a manner that a
new situation can be subsumed by a new solution.”14
The Validity of Ijtihad
Many Qur’anic verses appear to validate ijtihad: “Verily, in these things are
ayat (e.g., proof, evidences, lessons, signs) for people who reflect” (13:3);
“Verily, in these things are ayat for the people who understand” (13:4); and
“Surely, We have sent down to you (O Muhammad) the book (this Qur’an)
in truth that you might judge between people by that which God has shown
you” (4:105). These verses support the use of ijtihad by qiyas.15 The follow-
ing verses obviously indicate its validity: “And consult them in their affairs”
(3:159) and “… who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation” (42:38).
In addition, many hadiths validate ijtihad. `Amr ibn al-`As (d. 65/684)
narrated that he heard the Prophet say: “If a jurist exerts efforts and arrives at
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a correct ruling, he will be rewarded twice. If he arrives at an errorenous rul-
ing, he will be rewarded once.”16 According to Mu`adh ibn Jabal’s (d. 18/640)
famous hadith:
The Prophet asked: “How will you judge when the occasion of deciding
a case arises?” He replied: “I shall judge in accordance with God’s book.”
The Prophet asked: “(What will you do) if you do not find guidance in
God’s book?” He replied: “(I will act) in accordance with the Sunnah of
the Messenger of God.” The Prophet asked: “(What will you do) if you
do not find guidance in the Sunnah of the Apostle of God and in God’s
book?” He replied: “I shall do my best to form an opinion and spare no
pains.” The Apostle of God then patted him on the chest and said: “Praise
be to God who helped the messenger of the Apostle of God to find a thing
which pleases the Apostle of God.”17
According to Muhammad al-Dasuqi, all jurists are to use ijtihad that is
valid and unanimously accepted. Undertaking it is a key to the ongoing
development of Islamic law and opens a gate to fiqh that will develop the
law when dealing with new issues. He further says that its use is a kind of
revelation of Islamic fiqh.18
Ra’y (Opinion)
The word ra’y is derived from the verb ra’a (to see something or some-
body), which was used later on as a verbal noun. It may also denote a dream
or a vision, a view, that which is known by the heart but cannot be seen with
the eyes (i.e., an opinion),19 or i`tiqad (faith, belief), zann (assumption), `ilm
(knowledge, science), `aql (reason, intellect, mentality), tadbir (precaution),
and isabah (target).20
Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350) points out that one aspect of ra’y is “after
considering a subject and making a judgment from the heart, a search
through the evidence and inferences, both of which have their own consid-
erations, is made to implement the truth, reality.”21 Raghib al-Isfahani (d.
502/1109) defines ru’yah as “to perceive an object which is seen.” This per-
ception is divided into the following parts: (1) the five senses and that which
replaces the senses in a similar activity; (2) wahm (illusion, false impression)
and tahayyul (imagination), (3) tafakkur (contemplation), and (4) ` aql (intel-
lectual faculty) and idrak (perception).22
Studying ra’y from the historical perspective shows that there have been
different views as to its first use. The majority of scholars state that its use
began during the Prophet’s lifetime. An alternative point of view with regard
to the ruling being based on ra’y suggests that ra’y was used only after the
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Prophet’s death, when the Companions were faced with issues that had not
been detailed in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. This view is disputed by such
scholars as Ibn Khaldun (d. 808/1405) and Ibn Hazm. Ibn Khaldun writes:
“The rulings had been taught either during the time of the Prophet through
revelation, which was sent to the Prophet, or his direct speeches and attitudes;
therefore, it was unnecessary to apply intellectual reasoning or qiyas.”23 Ibn
Hazm says: “The claim that ra’y appeared at the time of the Companions had
nothing to do with the Companions’ actions, contrary to the report that the
Companions used ra’y; the validity of such reports and narrations is uncer-
tain.”24 According to these scholars, the sources of Islamic law at the time of
the Prophet were confined to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Ijma` took shape
after the time of the Companions, and qiyas was used when a ruling did not
have a nass (textual) reference in the main sources of guidance.25
The Relationship between Iijtihad and Ra’y
The usuli scholars have called the practice of inference to reach a ruling ijti-
had, qiyas, or ra’y.26 There are different views on whether ra’y is a kind of
ijtihad or qiyas. For example, al-Shafi`i (d. 204/819) says that ra’y is not
based on a validated source of the Shari`ah, but that it is only a making of
inferences that depends purely on intellectual reasoning and inclination.
Therefore, he criticizes scholars who used it in their ijtihad. He also consid-
ers ra’y and qiyas to be opposed to one another.27 Al-Ghazzali sees ra’y and
qiyas as synonyms: “Ra’y consists of comparing and representing any rul-
ing to itself.”28
Some jurists, particularly Shafi`i scholars, opine that ra’y is synony-
mous with qiyas. Taking into account the practice of the Companions and
the Successors, some scholars view it as a kind of comprehensive method of
ijtihad consisting of qiyas, istihsan, al-masalih al-mursalah (consideration
of the public interest), and sadd al-dhara’i` (blocking the means).29 Al-
Sarakhsi (d. 483/1090) believes that ra’y is more extensive than qiyas. For
example, he interprets “Then take admonition, O you with eyes (to see)”
(59:2) by saying that i`tibar (admonition) means practicing ra’y in place of
that which has no nass and qiyas.”30 `Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf (d. 1956), who
defines it as “analogizing and thinking in order to reach the right ruling in a
field where no nass is available by the Shari`ah provided for the purpose of
inference,” says that ra’y is more comprehensive than qiyas.31
Al-Shawkani (d. 1250/1834) points out that ra’y could have been
applied to explaining and interpreting the nass: “Ijtihad by ra’y can be the
way of inference from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. It was originally permit-
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ted in the Shari`ah for the consideration of benefit and in cases of necessity.”32
Fathi Dirini believes that confining ijtihad to ra’y on issues that have no nass
is incorrect, for he says that the Companions’ interpretations should also be
included in the circle of ijtihad by ra’y. For example, when Abu Bakr was
questioned on kalalah (a matter dealing with inheritance),33 he replied: “I
will express my point of view on this issue. If it is correct and rightly done,
then it is from God; if I fall into error, then it is from me and from Satan.”34
Accordingly, we can see that ra’y has virtually the same meaning as ijti-
had. The Companions applied ijtihad by ra’y according to their perception
of the Prophet’s action.35 However, it is clear that ijtihad is more comprehen-
sive than ra’y. At the time of the Companions and the Successors, the con-
stituent parts of ra’y were clear and extensive, as opposed to the nass, which
was not obviously clarified and defined. Following that period, some jurists
continued to use ra’y, in the meaning of ijtihad, in a wider range. At the
same time, the majority of jurists confined the use of inference to issues on
which no nass was available to reach a right and just ruling. In addition to
qiyas, they also used istihsan, al-masalih al-mursalah, sadd al-dhara’i`, and
`urf that agreed with the Shari`ah’s general aim and spirit. Hence, the field
of ra’y is narrow when compared to that of ijtihad. However, it is more com-
prehensive than qiyas and, consequently, is called ijtihad by ra’y.36
Ijtihad by Ra’y at the Time of the Prophet
Muslim scholars disagree on whether the Prophet performed ijtihad by ra’y
on such issues as daily maintenance, the rules related to war and peace or
attack and defense, or solving disputes or juridical and political issues.37
According to Ibn al-Humam, some Hanafi jurists confined his ijtihad by
ra’y to qiyas in situations where there was no revelation.38
At this time, many rulings and legislations were determined by wahy
(revelation). Problems were solved either by revelation or by the Prophet
through inspiration. Even in situations where there was no revelation, the
Prophet used his knowledge-based experience and ra’y to perform ijtihad.
He is reported to have said: “When I do not receive a revelation, I adjudicate
among you on the basis of my opinion.”39 If he made a mistake, it was cor-
rected through subsequent revelations.40
Revelation enabled the Prophet to give general rules of guidance for
social issues during his time and for future generations, thereby ensuring that
Muslims could carry out their affairs.41 However, according to the Ash`aris,
the Mu`tazilah, Ibn Hazm al-Zahiri, and some Hanbali and Shafi`i scholars,
the Qur’an provides clear evidence that every utterance of the Prophet par-
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takes of wahy: “He says nothing of his own desire; it is nothing other than
revelation sent down to him” (53:3). In other words, all of his rulings con-
sist of divine revelations and are not considered ijtihad.42
Another view is that we cannot judge his situation due to the evidence’s
conflicting nature. This view is attributed to al-Shafi`i and upheld by al-
Baqillani (d. 403/1013) and al-Ghazzali. Al-Shawkani, however, rejects the
idea that the Qur’an gives us clear indications that ijtihad was permissible
for the Prophet and that he could make mistakes.43 On the other hand, the
ulama who support this view say that any errors that the Prophet might have
made were rectified either by him or through a subsequent revelation.44 For
example, the Qur’an rebuked him for one of his mistakes: “It is not fitting
for a Prophet that he should have prisoners (of war) until he has thoroughly
subdued the earth” (8:67). 
This verse was revealed concerning the reported seventy captives taken
during the Battle of Badr. The Prophet first asked Abu Bakr what should be
done with them. Abu Bakr suggested that they should be ransomed, where-
as `Umar ibn al-Khattab opined that they should be executed. The Prophet
approved of Abu Bakr’s view, but then the verse disapproving of such an
action was revealed. Elsewhere, God asks the Prophet: “God granted you
pardon, but why did you permit them to do so before it became clear to you
who was telling the truth?” (9:43). This verse shows that the Prophet par-
doned those who did not participate in the Battle of Tabuk. These verses
indicate that the Prophet had, on some occasions, acted on his own ijtihad,
for if he had followed a divine command, there would have been no cause
for a reprimand or the granting of divine pardon for his mistakes.
Several narrations document the use of ijtihad by ra’y. For example,
when the Prophet saw the people of Madinah fertilizing palm trees, he for-
bade it. But when he heard that the trees had become barren, he said: “I’m a
human being. If I order you to do something in the name of your religion,
then conform to it. However, if I order something that depends on my per-
sonal ra’y, I am only a human being.”45 In another narration, a woman from
Juhayna asked him: “My mother vowed to make a pilgrimage, but she died
before she could fulfill the vow. Can I do it in her name?” The Prophet
replied: “Yes, fulfill the pilgrimage instead of her. If your mother had a debt,
would you not pay it? Pay your debts (fulfill your promises), because God
fulfills promises too.”46 Here, the Prophet compares two similar things,
showing that to fulfill a promise made to God is the same as fulfilling a
promise made to a human being. This type of analogy is called awla’.47
Another example of qiyas is as follows. A nomad tried to reject his
ancestors by telling the Prophet: “My wife gave birth to a black baby.” The
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Prophet asked: “Do you have grey camels among your red ones?” When the
nomad said that he did, the Prophet asked: “Where did they come from?”
The nomad said: “They presumably look like their ancestors.” The Prophet
then told him: “Your child presumably also looks like his ancestors.”48
The Prophet preserved most of the pre-Islamic Arabic customs,
although a few were changed, such as trade, pawn, rent, salam (contract of
purchase of goods with pre-payment), marriage, equality between husband
and wife, and murder.49 When the Prophet came to Madinah, he saw that its
people were making salam agreements for one or two years. To emphasize
this, he said: “Anyone who makes salam agreements should do this accord-
ing to specific measurements and for determined periods.”50 This practice,
which was common among the Arabs, was practiced freely after a few
amendments.51
Thus, the Prophet applied and practiced ijtihad by ra’y and trained the
Companions to follow his example. His instruction was practical rather than
theoretical. The Prophet’s practice of ijtihad by ra’y provided the example
for qiyas, istihsan, maslahah, sadd al-dhara’i` and `urf.
The Companions’ Use of Ijtihad by Ra’y by 
There is evidence that the Companions performed ijtihad by ra’y both in the
Prophet’s presence and absence52 concerning such matters as the adhan
(the call to prayer), ghusl (ritual ablution of the whole body), and postpon-
ing the prayer. The Prophet included rulings pertaining to law within the
range of ijtihad.53 During the time of revelation and as long as there were
no explanations or prohibitions from God, the Companions considered ijti-
had permissible.54
When an issue arose and no relevant Qur’anic verses could be found, the
Prophet performed ijtihad by ra’y. He also authorized the Companions to use
the same method under the same circumstances.55 For example, Mu`adh ibn
Jabal, `Amr ibn al-`As, and `Uqbah ibn `Amir (d. 58/677) performed ijtihad
in his presence.56
Mu`adh ibn Jabal’s hadith, “I shall spare no pains to do my best to form
an opinion,”57 has already been mentioned. Other examples are as follows:
During the Battle of Dhat Thalasi, `Amr ibn al-`As led a group of soldiers.
While fighting, he entered the state of junub (requiring a ritual ablution of the
entire body). Afraid that such an ablution made during the severe cold might
kill him, he made tayammum (using clean sand or soil when water is unavail-
able) and led the prayer, saying: “God says in the Qur’an: ‘Do not kill your-
selves.’” When he returned, he told the Prophet what he had done, and the
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Prophet approved of it.58 Due to his fear, ` Amr applied a practice that was per-
missible when there was no water or when the person was too ill to use it. I
agree that ` Amr used a form of istihsan by taking ease as the basis of his deci-
sion, in accordance with the Shari`ah’s spirit but contrary to the general rule.
When he was a qadi (judge) in Yemen, `Ali used ijtihad by ra’y when
deciding which of the three men who had had sexual intercourse with the
same woman over a certain period of time was the father. He asked them to
draw straws, saying that whoever drew the shortest straw would have the
child acknowledged as his and would pay two diyah (monetary compensa-
tion) to the other two. When the Prophet learned of this, he acknowledged
the correctness of ` Ali’s action.59 Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Hajawi (d. 1956),
considers this ruling a form of istihsan.60 If this or any similar issues arose
today, modern technology would be the vehicle used to confirm paternity.
Thus, using technology can be a method of istihsan based on maslahah. 
During the Prophet’s lifetime, both he and the Companions, with his
permission, used ijtihad in light of the Shari`ah. Accordingly, personal judg-
ment and human contributions were integrated into the life of Islamic law.
This integration is not regarded as strange, for the law’s cornerstone, the
maqasid al-Shari`ah (the law’s objectives), has to be taken into considera-
tion when performing ijtihad.
Ijtihad in Terms of Istihsan
Al-Karkhi defines istihsan as “the principle which authorizes departure from
an established ruling to similar cases and authorizes applying an alternative
established ruling to cases similar to those which set the precedent.” The
departure is authorized only when there is enough reason to justify it.61
Doing this in the case of a certain issue, one that had been applied earlier to
a similar case, to another ruling must be based on clear evidence established,
in the jurists’ opinion, by nass, ijma`, darurah, `urf, maslahah, qiyas khafiy
(implicit analogy), or other sources. This is true irrespective of the methods
upon which the earlier, similar ruling depended, such as dalil `am (general
evidence), qa’idah fiqhiyah (jurisprudence rule), or qiyas zahir jaliy (appar-
ent clear analogy). This is the meaning of istihsan according to Hanafi jurists;
other jurists, especially Maliki scholars, also apply this definition.62
Sometimes an issue is included within the range of a settled general rule
with the common characteristic of nass or in the light of some evidence.
However, another specific evidence can be a nass, darurah, `urf, or masla-
hah that can be used in opposition to the common nass or the common rule.
The mujtahid (competent jurist) must be convinced that this specific evi-
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dence is to be preferred before abandoning the practice of the common nass
or common judgments used in such issues, and judge according to the spe-
cific evidence.
Sometimes when an issue is not within the range of a nass, qiyas is used.
Here we come across two different possibilities: apparent clear analogy and
implicit analogy (khafi qiyas). If the mujtahid finds that the second one is
stronger, the judgment given, accordingly, is called istihsan.63 Through istih-
san, some issues within the range of the common nass and such criteria as
difficulty, complexity, darurah, and need are removed because of their spe-
cific nature, and a new judgment is given to implement the maslahah.
If one studies the nass from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, many examples
can be found. Istihsan is used to remove the common nass or a settled rule
from its area of application. The mujtahid who applies this principle applies
the essence of what the Shari`ah wants in any given situation or place in
order to remove harm or discomfort and establish maslahah.64 In the general
sense, istihsan is concerned with maslahah and the mujtahid uses his/her
judgment in the context of general rules by proving a stronger evidence per-
taining to the particular situation. The basis for the mujtahid’s judgment
could be darurah, maslahah, `urf, ijma`, or the nass of the Qur’an or the
Sunnah. In the latter case, God becomes the one who actually gives this
exceptional judgment, the one who performs istihsan, and it is by His
announcement that this istihsan becomes legal.65
As such, the Shari` (the Lawgiver) considers the special situations and
circumstances with specific conditions and then abolishes the difficulty,
complexity, and harm. This provides an ideal guide for the mujtahid. On this
issue, Mustafa Zarqa’ says: “The Qur’an and the Sunnah are both istihsan,
which is the creation of the Shari`. The concept of istihsan is to guide the
mujtahid when applying the nass of the Shari` to issues of life. The mujtahid
makes istihsan inspired by the method that the Shari` applies, and in this
way the mujtahid implements the Shari`’s purpose and intentions.”66
The messenger and explorer of the Qur’an is the Prophet, who applied
the method taught by the Qur’an from the general nass and established rules
for exceptional conditions and circumstances. Various examples can be
found in the Sunnah. Before we examine these issues, I shall give a few
examples mentioned in the Qur’an.
Qur’an 24:4 says: “And those who accuse chaste women and produce
not four witnesses, flog them with eighty stripes and reject their testimony
forever.” As stated, the accusation of adultery has a more damaging effect on
society than the action itself. The “general sentence” for a man who has seen
a woman commit adultery is flogging. However, if he is her husband, then,
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according to the general sentence, he should stay silent or come forward with
four witnesses. Failure to produce these witnesses after coming forward will
result in his being flogged for qadhf (slander, accusation). This sentence obvi-
ously causes the husband to suffer. Therefore, if he cannot substantiate his
claim, the court can, according to Qur’an 24:6 and the following surah, dis-
solve the marriage. In such a case, he would not be punished for qadhf.67
According to the general rules, fasting during Ramadan is obligatory
for every adult Muslim with the exception of, among others, those who are
ill or traveling: “And whoever is ill or on a journey, the same number of
days which one did not fast must be made up from other days. God intends
for you ease, and He does not want to make things difficult for you”
(2:185). This is prescribed because of the special circumstances: the diffi-
culties that may arise.68 If the general sentence of the obligation of fasting
were to be applied to the sick and the travelers, such difficulties and suffer-
ings might only delay the healing process or lead to the sick person’s death.
Such a result would contradict the Shari`’s general aims, among which are
“to protect human life.”
Among the Prophet’s Sunnah based on istihsan, some of the ijtihad by
ra’y practices are as follows. A business contract known as salaf or salam
allows a person to sell something in return for cash and to show a commit-
ment to deliver it in the future.69 There are two nass concerning this issue. One
is general and concerns such a contract’s invalidity. The Prophet told Hakim
ibn Hizam: “Do not sell something that you don’t own.”70 The second is more
specific and concerns such a contract’s validity. When the Prophet moved to
Madinah, he saw that its people made salam sales for one and two years
regarding their produce. He said: “Those of you who sell goods with salam
should do this according to stated measurements, scales, and time.”71 The rea-
son why he changed his earlier ruling was the people’s present needs.72
The general sentence for theft is: “Cut off (from the wrist joint) the
(right) hand of the thief, male or female, as a recompense for that which they
committed, a punishment by way of example from God” (5:38). During a
battle, a man who was caught stealing was brought to Busr ibn Artai, the
commander. He ordered the thief to be beaten but did not have his hand cut
off, for: “The Prophet prohibited us from severing hands during war-time.”73
The general ruling of the nass was leniency, thereby lessening the possibility
the thief might join the enemy, something that would cause serious prob-
lems.74 When two problems occur, the lesser of the two evils is to be pre-
ferred.75 This principle is taken from the general nass of the Shari`.
During the Battle of Badr, Khabbab ibn Mundhir asked the Prophet about
the first place picked for the camp: “O, Messenger of God. Is this a place that
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God has disclosed and we have to accept, or is it a ra’y or a war strategy?”
When the Prophet answered: “No, it is a ra’y and a war strategy,” Khabbab
replied: “This is not an appropriate place. I suggest that we set up camp by
the water, make ourselves a pond, fill it with water, and close all of the other
wells. This will deprive the enemy of water.” The Prophet accepted this sug-
gestion and changed the place.76 The Prophet, by comparing the enemy to
other living beings, might have made the following qiyas: “You can’t deprive
them of water, just as you can’t deprive these of water.” However Khabbab,
considering that it was a time of war and that the enemy did not have the right
to live, came to a different conclusion.77 In the end, Khabbab’s opinion was
chosen, as it was more likely to further the cause of the Muslims.
The Prophet asked his Companions on the day of the Battle of Khandaq
about reaching an agreement with the Gatafan polytheists: one-third of Madi-
nah’s fruits if they would leave the battlefield. Sa`d ibn Mu`adh and Sa`d ibn
`Ubadah said: ‘If this is God’s will, we will listen and obey God’s order. If
this is not a revelation but a ra’y, we will only give them swords, because dur-
ing the Days of Ignorance, when neither of us had a religion, they could only
get Madinah’s fruits by buying them from us or if we treated them. Now
when God has honored us with His religion, we refuse to offer them anything
except disparagement, and we swear that we can only give them our swords.”
After this, the Prophet said: “I saw that the Arabs came together to be one
against you, and I wanted to send them away. You have the right not to accept
it. There is no problem.”78 They insisted on their views.
These examples, which are nass from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, show
that in special circumstances one of the Shari`’s common goals is to remove
difficulties and complexities, thereby confirming the principles of public
need and interest. These rulings show that it is important to note the differ-
ences between similar events. One should not always look at events categor-
ically, generally, or prescriptively. If there are differences, it is necessary to
make a ruling based on merit. Apparently, it would be wrong to apply qiyas
to events that appear to be in the scope of general rules and then attempt to
include the resulting ruling as a general rule when, in fact, it is an excep-
tional one. In circumstances like these, the correct way is to evaluate events
with special features according to merit, namely, to apply istihsan.79
The Prophet rejected a request to fix the price of goods, as doing so
might be unfair to the seller.80 However, Sai`d ibn al-Musayyab (d. 94/712),
Rabi`ah ibn Abi ` Abd al-Rahman (d. 136/753), Yahya ibn Sa`id al-Ansari (d.
147/760), and other jurists made a juridical decision regarding the pricing of
goods based on their personal opinions of the day’s economic climate.81
Those scholars believed that understanding the maslahah is crucial to pro-
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tecting people from incorrect rulings.82 According to al-Shaybani, Ibrahim
al-Nakha`i said: 
Supposing someone murdered someone else at his front door and alleged
that he committed the crime in order to protect his goods and honor. To be
able to give a verdict, an investigation is carried out. The case may have
two possible outcomes. In the first scenario, the law of retaliation is not
applied, but the blood-money has to be paid even if the victim is guilty of
stealing. However, if the victim is known to be a respectable man, then the
law of retaliation must come into effect. In the second scenario, the law of
retaliation is also dropped, but the blood-money is paid, even if the victim
is guilty of adultery and/or fornication. However, the murderer will be
prosecuted if the victim is known as a person who is chaste and virtuous.83
He gives more consideration to the spirit of the nass rather than to its literal
meaning, neither rejecting nor applying the law of retaliation based on false
testimony, but rather supporting his claims with evidence and thereby avoid-
ing incorrect judgments. In other words, he considers nothing other than the
maslahah.84
In the view of some Iraqi scholars, the law of retaliation with regard to
stolen goods comes into effect only when their value exceeds a certain
amount. For them, this minimum is five dirhams (silver coins), although the
generally accepted minimum is usually ten. The minimum value of stolen
goods is extrapolated by qiyas from the minimum value of the marriage
dowry. However, these scholars disagreed: “We are surprised that entering
into a sexual relationship is allowed by so little an amount.” In addition,
Ibrahim al-Nakha`i thought that the dowry should not be less than forty
dirhams and thus resorted instead to istihsan, which yielded more useful
results than qiyas.85
At the time of the Companions and the Followers, to be a witness in court
for the defense of close relatives (e.g., one’s father or child) was allowed in
accordance with the belief that “everybody’s testimony is valid if he is
Muslim and righteous.”86 However, over time and the inevitable weakening
of the Muslims’ faith, jurists concluded that this ruling might no longer serve
society’s needs, since the possibility of bias and injustice would bring untold
harm to the social fabric. Thus they rejected the testimony of relatives to pre-
vent corruption and preserve justice and social harmony. The juristic decision
was confined to offspring, fathers, brothers, and spouses.87
According to Islamic law, a widow’s mourning period should last for
four months and ten days, during which time she should not use kohl or per-
fume. A woman asked the Prophet if her widowed daughter could use kohl
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to aid her painful eyes. In spite of her insistence, the Prophet said “No” three
times.88 However, Imam Malik (d. 179/795), Salim ibn `Abd Allah (d.
106/724), and Sulayman ibn Yasar (d. 107/725) rule that a woman in such a
situation may cure her eyes with kohl or another medicine.89 While there is
no possibility that these Followers would oppose the Prophet’s saying, they
considered his prohibition as applying only to that particular woman, as her
condition did not necessitate the use of kohl. Their judgment was correct,
based on their desire to avoid hardship (raf `al-haraj) and attain benefit.90
Istihsan among the Companions
Even though the term istihsan had not been used in the technical sense before
the Iraqi school appeared, it existed in practice during the time of the
Companions and was widely applied.91 An allusion to this can be found in
`Umar’s letter to Abu Musa al-Ash`ari: “Research similar cases, and when
you find similarities that affect the ruling, apply the method of qiyas. Using
the results of qiyas, select the ruling that adheres to the Islamic principles and
ensures that your conscience is satisfied that justice has been served.”92
According to the first part, `Umar wanted qiyas applied as soon as the simi-
larities were found and the result was deemed just. However, in the second
part he says that if this is not possible, then a ruling that accords with the basic
principles of justice and equity should be given. In other words, if the
resulting qiyas is not in keeping with the Shari`ah’s spirit, then the ruling of
similarities should be abandoned to give a ruling according to the special evi-
dence, that is, justice and equity (istihsan).93
I will now give some examples of the Companions’ istihsan. Muslim
men are allowed to marry Christian and Jewish women (5:6). `Umar
accepted this in principle, but prohibited it because he thought it would be
detrimental to Muslim women.94 In this example, we see conformity to the
maslahah together with the principle of understanding and applying Qur’anic
verses and hadiths by considering all the nass. `Umar gave a ruling that is
opposed to the general ruling of the nass in this special situation, according
to the Shari`ah’s objective and spirit.95
According to the general ruling of nass, those who inherit through
`asabah (agnates) inherit what remains after those who are entitled (ashabi
furud) have received their shares. If nothing remains, then they will receive
nothing.96 In one particular case, `Umar acted according to the general basic
rule97: the wife, mother, and siblings from the same maternal mother but
from a different father, along with the full brothers and the half-brothers
from the `asabah, all acted according to its basic rule. Full brothers share by
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virtue of having the same mother, a practice known as mushtarikah (shared),
because the brothers share in the third. This is the rule in every case in which
there is a husband and a mother or a grandmother, and two or more of the
mother’s offspring, and `asabah in the form of full siblings. This is also
known as the himariyah case, for when it was presented to `Umar, he
wanted to exclude the full brothers. They objected, saying: “Consider this.
If our father was a donkey (himar), do we not have the same mother?” So
he studied the case again and proclaimed a third for all of them equally, full
and uterine siblings, the man’s portion being the same as the woman’s.98
In this case, according to the general ruling of the nass, the full brothers
should have been deprived of their inheritance, as mentioned above.
However, after `Umar understood that this was not in accordance with the
Shari`ah’s general objective and spirit and that it did not accord with justice
and equity, he changed his opinion in accordance with istihsan.
The general ruling of Islam regarding conquered land and war booty is
that they should be divided among the war veterans: 
And know that whatever booty that you acquire [in war], verily one-fifth
of it is assigned to God and the Messenger, (and also) the relatives, the
orphans, the poor who beg, and the wayfarer. [This you must observe] if
you believe in God and in that which We sent down to Our servant
(Muhammad) on the day when truth was distinguished from falsehood,
they day when the two forces met in battle [at Badr]. And God is able to
do all things. (8:41)
And what God gave as booty to his Messenger from them, for which you
made no expedition with either cavalry or camelry. What God gave as
booty to His Messenger from the people of the townships, it is for God,
His Messenger, the kindred [of deceased Muslims], the orphans, the poor
who beg, and the wayfarer, in order that it may not become a fortune used
[only] by the rich among you. (59:6-7)
Nevertheless, this general ruling was not applied to the conquest of Iraq
and Syria during `Umar’s time. On the contrary, `Umar thought it would be
more convenient to make this land the Muslims’ common property, for this
would leave it in the hands of its owners, taxes could be levied upon it, and
the resulting revenue could be used to pay the wages of judges, officials, and
soldiers as well as to help widows, orphans, and those in need. In this, ` Umar
was forward-thinking, believing that these taxes would benefit future gener-
ations.99 Therefore, he abandoned the general ruling and devised a new one
that would implement the maslahah for future Muslims.100
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A woman from Sana’and her lover plotted to kill her husband. Ya’la ibn
`Umayyah, the city’s governor, reported this to ` Umar, whose view was sim-
ilar to the general ruling of the nass: Two people should not be executed for
the killing of one. `Ali defended the judgment to execute both of them, in
accordance with the spirit of the law of retaliation. Eventually, `Umar was
persuaded and wrote to Ya’la: “Execute them both. If, by any chance, the
whole city of Sana’ were involved in this murder, I would have had them all
killed.”101 By this example of ijtihad, `Umar and `Ali gave a ruling that did
not accord with the relevant Qur’anic verses:
O you who believe. Al-qisas (the law of equality in punishment) is pre-
scribed for you in the case of a murder: the free for the free, the slave
for the slave, and the female for the female. But if the relatives (or one
of them) of the murdered (person) forgive their brother (the killer)
something (i.e., not to kill the killer by accepting the blood-money in
intentional murders), then the relatives (of the victim) should demand
blood-money in a reasonable manner, and the killer must pay with hand-
some gratitude. This is alleviation and a mercy from your Lord. So after
this whoever transgresses the limits he shall have a painful torment.
(2:178)
And We ordained therein for them: life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose,
ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal. (5:45)
`Umar considered this in the beginning and so did not want to apply the
retaliation punishment. However, with `Ali’s contribution, the incident was
studied in greater detail, which led to the view that this particular punish-
ment should be applied, in keeping with the demands of maslahah and the
Shari`ah’s goal and spirit. The basis of this punishment is to implement jus-
tice and prevent further injustice. Thus, if istihsan had not been applied, jus-
tice would not have been implemented and the door would have been
opened for people with evil intentions.102
As seen, the Companions’ ijtihad is covered by the term istihsan. In all
of these examples, the rule of law was changed when conditions changed
and a fresh situation emerged.103 They did not act in accordance with the
given rules; instead, they acted according to their own initiative and princi-
ples, in keeping with the demands of maslahah and removing harm.104
Consequently, as has been indicated, the work of ijtihad never stops; rather,
it continues progressively. 
Thus, we see that the Companions actually practiced ijtihad based
mostly on shura (consultation), for there were no written juristic principles
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on which to base their rulings. During this period, the mujtahidun and the
muqallidun (the close and faithful followers of established rules) were
indistinguishable from each other. Ijtihad was not restricted to any one indi-
vidual or school of thought. When the nass was silent or not clearly identi-
fied, the Companions applied their personal opinions and anyone could
undertake ijtihad.105
Conclusion
The source of law during the first period was the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
The growth of Muslim society engendered different social issues and prob-
lems, which meant that the established law based on the Qur’an and the
Sunnah needed to be reconsidered, expanded, and reinterpreted to give ade-
quate answers to new issues. As a result, Islamic law made improvements
according to the circumstances of the era. This practice is ongoing.
The independent reconsidering and interpretation of the law was known
as ijtihad. Ra’y was the main element of ijtihad and became widespread,
gradually paving the way for the development of qiyas and istihsan.106 For
many years, it was believed that only those with an outstanding intellectual
ability could be involved in the process of rational rule-making. Qur’an 47:24
strongly encourages people to contemplate every single verse and then apply
their intellect and personal opinion to the new legal issues. The Prophet is a
good example of this practice, for he always considered the Companions’
opinions regarding those issues on which the nass was silent.
The problems faced by the Muslim community were solved easily and
effectively during the Prophet’s lifetime, as he was the supreme authority to
comment on the verses and explain them to the people. Following his death,
the problems increased and became more complex. The Companions had the
Qur’an and the Sunnah to guide them concerning the new issues that emerged
from the Muslim community’s increasingly complex social life. They also
used their own opinion to decide which verses or hadiths could be applied to
a particular case. Thus, they employed their own opinion in order to under-
stand the verses correctly and then apply them to new situations, and to
devise solutions for the more problematic cases in the absence of any clear
verses. 
The examples given above indicate that ijtihad by ra’y was used during
the Prophet’s lifetime to solve new problems. These two concepts, ijtihad
and ra’y, produced several legal methods for developing Islamic law. In par-
ticular, istihsan received inspiration from the generosity of the judicial
power of ijtihad and ra’y.
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